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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties in this action consist only of the former husband and wife to the 
marriage. 
The Appellant/Respondent is Beverly Sue Arnason. 
The Appellee/Petitioner is Anthony David Arnason. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a decree of divorce and division of marital property in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County; the Honorable Frank G. Noel 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's finding that inheritance funds had neither 
been consumed nor lost their identity and are therefore separate and not marital 
property was clearly erroneous when the inherited property was; (1) given to Mr. 
Arnason individually, (2) by personal check written to him from his mother, (3) 
placed in a separate personal bank account, and (4) used as a down payment on two 
homes. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a trial court's findings of fact under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a). Findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous when they are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence or if this Court has a 
firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 354 
(Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted). 
An appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, 
and then demonstrate why the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's 
conclusions. See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If 
Appellant does not marshal all the evidence, then this Court should refuse to consider the 
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issue. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). The 
Court should "give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses," and not set aside a challenged finding unless it is determined to be 
clearly erroneous. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Whether the trial court's finding, that inheritance funds as well as 
proceeds from the sale of Appellee's Carbon County property are not marital 
property, is clearly erroneous when the funds were; (1) given to Appellee personally 
from his mother and (2) received as proceeds from the sale of an individually owned 
home, (3) placed in a separate bank account, and (4) used to purchase and make 
improvements to two homes. 
Appellant provides an incorrect standard of review for this issue. Appellant 
couches the issue as one of a division of marital property, however, this is actually a 
question of findings of fact. The issue presented by Appellant is whether the inheritance 
funds and funds from the sale of a pre-marital home should be included as part of the 
marital estate. This is essentially the same issue as the first; i.e. whether the funds were 
traceable and identifiable, or whether they were consumed or lost their identity through 
commingling. Accordingly, the issue should be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. 
Pursuant to well settled law in Utah, the trial court made two separate 
determinations. First, under its findings of fact, the trial court determined whether the 
property was separate or marital property. This is a question of fact, and must be 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Second, the court equitably divided the 
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marital property. If the issue were a question of whether the division of marital assets 
was proper, then the standard of review would be one of "abuse of discretion." However, 
the issue as presented and argued by Appellant is one of determining whether property 
should have been classified as separate or marital. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND COURT RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1999). Disposition of property -
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.. ..Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on August 26, 1983 and separated in approximately 
April 1997. Mr. Arnason filed for divorce on or about May 5, 1997. This is an appeal of 
the findings of fact and resulting division of marital property entered by The Honorable 
Frank G. Noel, Third District Judge. 
Prior to the marriage, Mr. Arnason owned a home in Carbon County. He sold that 
home in 1996 for $21,000, and used $20,000 to pay down the mortgage on a home in 
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Sandy they purchased that same year. The trial court found that the home, as well as the 
proceeds therefrom were premarital property. The court found that $20,000 of the 
proceeds had been neither consumed nor lost their identity, and accordingly awarded that 
to Mr. Amason. 
Additionally, Mr. Amason also received inheritance funds as well as funds from a 
partnership which included his mother and all her children. These funds were given to 
Mr. Amason individually, and not to both parties. Approximately six months after the 
parties marriage, Mr. Amason purchased a home for $45,000 using funds he had received 
from his mother. Extensive improvements, which cost approximately $29,000 were 
made to the home which were paid for by Mr. Amason from funds received directly from 
his mother. 
Finally, in 1996, the parties purchased a home in Sandy with money from a 
separate bank account held exclusively by Mr. Amason, which included inheritance and 
partnership funds received from his mother. After finding that these funds were given as 
gifts to Mr. Amason personally, and that the funds had neither been consumed nor lost 
their identity through commingling, the trial court then used its discretion to divide the 
remaining marital property equitably. Ms. Arnason, appeals those findings and the 
resulting division of marital property. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Appellee David Arnason and Appellant Beverly Sue Arnason were married 
on August 26,1983. The parties became increasingly estranged during the course of their 
marriage, and separated in approximately April 1997. See Record at 227, p. 10. 
2. Appellee is a beneficiary of the Fern F. Arnason Family Trust, which 
consists of money saved by Appellee's mother and late father (the "inheritance" funds). 
Appellee also receives funds from the Arnason Family Partnership, which is a partnership 
between Appellee's mother and Appellee and his siblings. From 1982-1996, Appellee 
received approximately $130,246 from the trust and partnership (these funds are referred 
to in this brief as Appellee's "inheritance"). These funds were provided to Appellee by 
checks from his mother. Record at 227, p. 78, In. 16-24; p. 79, In. 16-25; p. 80, In. 1-16; 
p. 48, In. 12-22. 
3. Approximately six months after getting married, in February 1984, the 
parties purchased a home in Salt Lake City (the Salt Lake" home), which was the family 
home prior to purchasing the Sandy home in 1996. The majority of the funds for the Salt 
Lake home came from Appellee's inheritance funds, money received either prior to the 
marriage or at the beginning of marriage from Mr. Arnason's mother. Additionally, the 
extensive costs for improvements made to the Salt Lake home were all paid with 
inheritance funds as well. The funds were given by check to Mr. Arnason from his 
mother and then disbursed to the contractors. The total of these payments on the home 
from inheritance funds was $74,807 (consisting of $ 45,000 purchase price and $ 29,807 
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for improvements). Record at 227, p. 9, In. 15-18; p. 26, In. 15-22; p. 52, In. 10-12; p. 28, 
In. 6-11; p. 31, In. 24-25; p. 32, In. 1-4, 17-25. 
4. In about June of 1996, less than a year prior to their divorce the parties 
purchased a home in Midvale (the "Sandy" home). Appellee made a $47,527.00 down 
payment on the home using inheritance funds. Record at 227, p. 26, In. 15-20; p. 28, In. 
6-11. The money used for the down payment came from checks received by Appellee 
from his mother and which were placed directly into an individual credit union account. 
Record at 227, p. 28, In. 15. 
5. Mr. Arnason owned a home in Carbon County, which he purchased before 
his marriage to Appellant. Mr. Arnason purchased the home in the late 1970's and lived 
in it until 1983. Mr. Arnason owned the Carbon County home free and clear of any liens 
prior to the marriage. The home sold in 1996 for $21,000.00, $20,000.00 of which was 
used to pay for the Sandy home. Record at 227, p. 29, In. 5-6, p. 11-15; 70, In. 25; 71, 
ln.l. 
6. From 1993 on, both parties had their own bank accounts as well, to which 
the other did not have access. Record at 227, p. 28 In. 13-15; p. 85, In. 10-12. 
7. Mr. Arnason filed for divorce on or about May 5, 1997. Appellant filed an 
answer and counterclaim in June 1997. A trial was held on April 19,1999 before the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third District Judge. Pursuant to the trial, a decree of divorce 
was granted and entered on May 19, 1999. Record at 227, p. 141, In. 11-15. 
8. The trial court found that "Petitioner [Appellee] received gifts and 
inheritance from his parent's estate and from his parent's trust and partnership which 
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funds were separated by him into his own account and were used for down payment on 
his home in Sandy, Utah, and for down payment and major improvement on the home of 
the parties in Salt Lake City, Utah and for the purchase of Novell common Stock." 
Record at 211,119. 
9. The trial court also found that the "funds were not commingled in any form 
with marital funds or funds of Respondent [Appellant]." Findings of Fact and Record at 
211,119. 
10. The trial court found that the source of the funds used to purchase the 
homes and the stock "was identifiable and was traceable to the investments made which 
characterized the funds as separate assets of Petitioner and not marital assets of the 
parties." Record at 212,120. 
11. The trial court found that the funds were not commingled and were separate 
property of Petitioner. Record at 212, f 20. 
12. The trial court found that Petitioner received $20,000 from the sale of his 
premarital property (the Carbon County home) which was used to pay down the principal 
due on the mortgage of the Sandy, Utah home, and that those funds were separate 
property of the Petitioner, and not marital property. Record at 212, f 21. 
13. The trial court found that the amount of Petitioner's separate interest in the 
home, valued at $130,000, which was directly traceable to his inheritance funds was 
$74,807.00. Record at 213,123. 
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14. The trial court found that Respondent's claim as to the intent of Petitioner 
at the time the funds were invested in the two properties and the stock was not 
determinative. Record at 212, <][ 20. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's entire appeal depends on whether the trial court's findings that the 
inheritance funds, partnership funds, and the proceeds from the sale of the premarital 
property are clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence. They are not, 
therefore Appellant's appeal fails. 
It is well settled law that a court must first determine whether property is separate 
or marital, and second, divide the marital property equitably. The trial court did just that. 
It found that the funds Mr. Arnason received from his mother and his deceased father's 
estate were in fact separate funds. This was a proper finding which was supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. The evidence presented at trial showed that the money 
received by Mr. Arnason came from savings of his mother and his now-deceased father. 
Other money given directly and solely to Mr. Arnason came from the family trust and the 
family partnership. These funds were given to Mr. Arnason individually, and were 
deposited in Mr. Arnason's credit union account, which was an exclusive account for 
himself. The funds were not co-mingled with marital property to such an extent that they 
lost their identity, nor were they consumed. In fact, the court specifically found that the 
inheritance funds were identifiable and traceable to the current real property and stock. 
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While Appellant suggests the trial court improperly failed to consider evidence 
regarding Mr. Arnason's intent to use the inheritance funds, to the contrary, the court 
simply held that the intent at the time of purchase of the home was not determinative. 
Clearly the court considered all the evidence provided. Case law from this Court, the 
Utah Supreme Court, and courts from other jurisdictions show that there are numerous 
factors which should be considered when deciding whether a spouse's separate property 
has become part of the marital estate. There is no conclusive evidence that Mr. Arnason 
intended or in fact made a gift of his separate property to the marital estate. The court 
properly held that the inheritance funds as well as the funds from the pre-marital home 
were separate and therefore not part of the marital estate. Based on those findings, the 
court subsequently divided equitably the assets of the marital estate. 
The trial court followed Utah law in awarding the parties their equitable share in 
the marital estate. As stated above, the trial court made findings of fact as to what 
constituted separate property and what constituted marital property and then divided the 
marital properly evenly. Utah law presumes that each party is entitled to fifty percent of 
the value of the marital estate. There is absolutely no evidence that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it divided the marital estate equally among the parties. 
The Carbon County home was also deemed to be Mr. Arnason's separate property. 
It was owned entirely by Mr. Arnason prior to the marriage, and when it was sold in 
1996, the proceeds were placed in his separate bank account. Subsequently, a majority of 
those proceeds from the sale of the home were traceable to a $20,000 payment on the 
Sandy home. Accordingly, the court awarded that portion of the Sandy home to Mr. 
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Amason as separate property. Furthermore, the down payment on the Sandy home, 
purchased in 1996, came from inheritance funds which were given solely to Mr. Amason 
and placed in his individual bank account. 
While it is possible for a spouse's separate property to be consumed or lose its 
identity through commingling or gifts to the marital estate, the court specifically found 
that no such commingling ever existed and that no gift was ever made to the marital 
estate. The trial court properly considered the factors set forth under Utah law for 
determining separate property, and based on the evidence presented at trial, found that the 
funds from the Carbon County home as well as the inheritance funds were Mr. Arnason's 
separate property. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, therefore 
the property division should be upheld. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLEE'S INHERITANCE FUNDS 
WERE NOT COMMINGLED WITH MARITAL FUNDS IS NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
A. Courts Have the Power to Distribute Marital Property in Divorce 
Proceedings, 
The trial court is vested with the power to make distributions of marital property in 
a divorce action. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1999). Prior to making that determination, 
however, the trial court must first determine what constitutes marital property and what 
constitutes separate property. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). 
B. Property Acquired by One Spouse by Gift and Inheritance During the 
Marriage Should Be Awarded to That Spouse as Separate Property 
There is a presumption that property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) is that spouse's 
separate property. See Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As a 
general rule, equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought 
into the marriage.") (citations omitted); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
308 (Utah 1988). However, property acquired by gift and inheritance during marriage 
may become marital property under certain circumstances. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 
If by her efforts or expense the other spouse has "contributed to the enhancement 
maintenance, or protection of that property," a spouse may acquire an equitable interest 
in it. Id. at 309 (citations omitted). Also, the property may become part of the marital 
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estate if "the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling," or 
where "the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." 
Id. (citing Jeperson v. Jeperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) (wherein the court affirmed a 
property division by which the value of one spouse's separate property was paid from the 
equity in the marital home prior to a division of the remaining equity)). Here, the trial 
court made specific findings that (1) the inheritance funds and family partnership funds 
came personally to Mr. Arnason, (2) the funds were identifiable and traceable to the 
equity in the homes, and (3) they were neither consumed nor lost their identity through 
commingling or gift to the marital estate. These findings were not clearly erroneous. 
C. In Order to Overrule the Findings, The Court of Appeals Must Find that the 
Trial Court's Findings are Clearly Erroneous, 
The trial court's determinations, that the inheritance funds as well as those from 
the sale of the Carbon County home are separate property, constitute findings of fact. See 
Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424 ("To permit appellate review of the trial court's property 
distribution.. .the distribution must be based upon adequate factual findings."). In 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the court stated that 
upon reviewing a court's findings, "we will give due regard 'to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,' and we do not set aside a challenged 
finding except when we determine it to be clearly erroneous." Id. at 603 (citation 
omitted). The Schaumberg court followed the provisions of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which states in part, "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
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shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Also, "[a] finding of fact will be found clearly erroneous when it is contrary 
to the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court has a 'definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 354 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (further citations omitted). 
In order to properly challenge findings of the trial court, the appellant "must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial courts findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate ofBartell 116 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); See also Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 
79 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The court "will uphold the trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to appropriately 
marshal all of the evidence." Allredv. Brown, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(cited in Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (wherein the court 
upheld the trial court's ruling because the Appellant "had not properly marshaled the 
evidence but had merely recited the findings on point and then highlighted the evidence 
which he deems contrary to the findings."). 
Appellant's brief in no way meets the standard set forth in Bartell. Indeed, though 
it fails to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, Appellant's brief 
in fact sets forth a substantial amount of support for the trial court's findings that the 
funds were identifiable and traceable, and that they were neither commingled nor gifted 
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to the marital estate. Appellant barely attempts to marshal the evidence supporting the 
trial court's decision, and then simply reasserts the same evidence and arguments which 
were rejected at trial. 
D. The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding that the Inheritance Funds 
Were Neither Consumed nor Lost Their Identity 
The trial court properly found that Mr. Arnason did not commingle his Inheritance 
funds with marital property. In its findings of fact and conclusions of lawr the trial court 
unequivocally stated that the "funds were not commingled in any form with marital funds 
or funds of Respondent [Appellant]." Record at 211, [^ 19. The court also found that 
The source of the funds used was identifiable and was traceable to the 
investments made which characterized the funds as separate assets of 
Petitioner [Appellee] and not marital assets of the parties. The funds were 
not commingled and are determined to be separate property interests of 
Petitioner [Appellee]. 
Record at 212, f 20. Appellant cannot sustain her burden and show that these findings of 
fact are so unsupported by the evidence that they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. 
1. The Funds are Clearly Mr. Arnason's 
As stated in Mortensen, the courts should "generally award property acquired by one 
spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 
that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value..." Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. It is undisputed that the funds at issue were at least at one point the 
separate property of Mr. Arnason. The inheritance funds provided to Appellee consist of funds 
from the Fern F. Arnason Family Trust. See Record at 227, p. 78-79. Other funds came directly 
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to Mr. Arnason from the Arnason Family Partnership, which is a partnership between Fern 
Arnason and her children. See Record at 227 p. 79, In. 16-25; 80, In. 1-16. Fern Arnason gave 
$126,100.00 to Mr. Arnason from the trust and the partnership from 1982 through 1996. See 
Record at 227, p. 79, In. 1-5, 22-24; p. 80, In. 8-10. All funds were distributed to Mr. Arnason 
individually and separately, and not to the parties jointly nor to Appellant. See Record at 227, p. 
78, In. 16-25; p. 79, In. 1-3,19-24; p. 80, In. 8-16. The "vast majority" of the property was 
deposited in Appellee's individual account. See Record at 49, In. 12-22. 
2. The fact that inheritance money was used to purchase homes used by 
the family does not conclusively establish that the funds were 
consumed or their identity lost 
The property was clearly Mr. Arnason's separate property at one time, therefore 
the Appellant must show that the finding that the assets were not commingled was clearly 
erroneous. As set forth in Mortensen, a party's property may become marital property if 
it "has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Mortensen, 
760 P.2d at 308. Based on the evidence before the court, it found that the property had 
not been consumed nor had it lost its identity. 
In this case, Mr. Arnason testified that he made a down payment of $47,527 on the 
Sandy home. These funds came from Appellee's mother's estate. See Record at 28, In. 
6-11. Mr. Arnason received these funds though checks that he deposited in his credit 
union account. Id. In. 13-15. This account was an exclusive account in the name of Mr. 
Arnason only. Id. None of the inheritance funds used for the down payment on the 
Sandy home were earned by either of the parties. In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1990) this court affirmed a trial court's award where the trial court found that 
the proceeds from the sale of the marital home would be divided evenly only after the 
value of the land given to one of the parties prior to marriage was given to that party. 
The court accordingly affirmed a determination that part of the marital home was 
separate property and part was marital property. Similarly, in Humphreys v. Humphreys, 
520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme Court held it proper to remove the separate 
property portion of the family home prior to dividing equally the marital portion. The 
court said, "it is our conclusion that plaintiffs $3,400, which was used as a down 
payment to purchase their family home, should be reimbursed to her..." Id. at 196. The 
evidence showed that the $3,400 was money she received from the sale of a previously 
owned home. Id. See also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (holding 
that wife was properly credited with inheritances used to purchase homes); Preston v. 
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) (holding that the husband should have been credited 
with his $9,310.93 contribution to the jointly owned cabin from assets owned prior to the 
marriage); and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (holding that the 
trial court properly granted spouse the amount of her contribution to the home, and 
stating, "[ajlthough the home was held in joint tenancy, that is not conclusive that a gift 
has been made."). In Jesperson, the parties during their marriage owned three different 
mobile homes, including the one that had been purchased by the plaintiff prior to 
marriage. Id. The court found that the mobile home and lot had been purchased for 
$19,027, "which was contributed from Plaintiffs separate funds..." The home had 
gained value during the marriage, and therefore the court awarded the plaintiff the 
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amount she had contributed from separate property, hi The court then properly divided 
the remaining equity in the home which was lound to be marital property ] .. - :>. •' 
I Ins is t'Uttly wli.il Ilk1 i uuiiI iiiliiii! nil llnk present i as*1 Inliriil.im v funds .ind p.irlnrrship 
funds wer- -iv-m individually to Mr. Arnason. Those 'funds were placed into his separate 
account, and thee used to purchase the Sandy home. See Record at 227, p. 31 , In 24-25; 
P ,„.
 : , held thai tin ni<nwy \uid h\ Mi \\ n.i1 »n < as ti aceable to till z 
nld receive that money upon the sale oi uic home. See Record at 
211. The trial court's findings are based upon the evidence presentedb> the ponies at 
*~~
!
 Each party had an opportunity to te^tilv a* v^. U U^ vlr. Arnason ^ nu-i-, ^ *.^, 
are not so lacking in support as to be against tiie clear weight oi the evidence, 
••••iking them "clearly erroneous " m- n.»re. the Court should uphold those findings of 
3. Evidence that some of the funds were deposited in a joint checking 
account for a short period of time does not establish commingling 
in in,1 laci iiiiii sunn,1 in unit/* i no, KS pjm iinin mi m I in " mason miinIm\ niiiiiii11 in iiih 
mother were put into a joint checking account for a period of tiinw <uw^ nut necessitate 
the finding that the funds were consumed or its identity lost, In fad. simply because a 
couple has property in a joint account does not necessaiil) mean it has become par I: of the • 
marital estate A\ '.tiovi n ilttnr, the men1 (,nl lh.il m I n HUH1 is muied h\ lllnifh spouses dors 
not mean that the individual funds used to purchase that home have been consumed or 
lost their identity As stated by the court in Jesperson i \ Jesperson, "Although the home 
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was held in joint tenancy, that is not conclusive that a gift has been made." Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, 610 P.2d at 328. Similarly, in Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) the Court held that a trial court properly awarded husband money which had been 
put into a bank account prior to marriage. In Udy, the Ms. Udy argued that it was error 
for the court to award Mr. Udy money as separate property, however the court of appeals 
upheld the finding of separate property. Consistent with these cases, the court in this case 
held that the simple fact that the checks from Mr. Amason's mother to Mr. Arnason were 
deposited for a brief period of time in a joint checking account is not conclusive that a 
gift to the marital estate has been made, nor that the funds had been consumed nor lost 
their identity. 
4. The money used to purchase and remodel the Salt Lake home came from 
Mr. Amason's mother 
The court held that the funds used to purchase and remodel the Salt Lake home 
were traceable from Mr. Amason's mother to Mr. Amason and then to the Salt Lake 
home. Approximately six months after the couple married, they purchased the Salt Lake 
home for $45,000.00, the majority of which came from Mr. Amason's mother. Record at 
227, p. 30, In. 1-4; p. 31, In. 24-25; p. 32, In. 1-4. Furthermore, when asked where the 
funds used for all of the improvements of the home came from, Mr. Amason testified, 
"All of those came from my mother." Record at 32, In. 17-19. And when asked what it 
meant that they came from his mother, Mr. Arnason testified, "Checks from her estate 
which she made in my name and then I disbursed them to the contractors/' Record at 
227, p. 32 In. 20-22. No contrary evidence was provided. Based on this unopposed 
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testimony, the court found that the money for the down payment and improvements to the 
property were identifiable a ml I U U M M I 1 lo lli< Sail 1 ,ike Ilonn , \\i\'n II.mi ttitVivd no • 
iilrsiinioiiv Imi show that the funds had been either consumed or lost their idei*nV . 
5. ' None of the evidence of" commingling cited by Appellant is persuasive 
lilt ntui l pHipi'il'i i n m v n l nil f i r ru i lemv pirs< iilcill b Ihr p.ulies IH.MIIINM1 
commhelinsr and found, "[t]he funds were not commingled and ai e detei mined to be 
-epanie property interests of Petitioner [Appellee]." Record at ^12. f 20 The tes t ing— 
•. ^  iS;ost a s i xmonm pci . . - - ( . 
a jc int • checking account p r -• a^cu iu pui chase the Salt Lake home. Next, 'the 
testimony is clear that all money for the remodeling and further construction on the Salt 
T „ i_ hrrnc came directh iiuin - Arnason's mother which was then disbursed b> IV li 
A :leai v I leth ti that monej < * as oi \ ( as nc t 
p i a c e c | in to the joint checking account prior" to disbui sement to the contractors; however, 
any time the funds spent in the joint account is negligible. .^ • -
vas purchased \ ith money i \ I li :h> :ame from I In: \i nason's 
iiiuiiici ana went directly tu Mr. Arnason's personal account. i\ ppellant testified that she 
. \ \\\) access 10 iliat account, nor did she even, know how much mc i - as in that 
separate account . .,. ,. . that boln.
 M pciiant and Appellee 
owned the homes. that they were purchased during the marriage of the parties, and that he 
didn i affirmative!} intend to keep part of the proceeds or the value of the homes from,, the 
A
 —
j :
 v"' . . " ~o evidence was introduced which, suggests that Appellee intended 
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to make a gift of his funds received from inheritance to the marital estate. In fact, the 
evidence clearly shows that the vast majority of those funds were kept in a separate bank 
account, exclusively controlled by Appellee. 
Next, Appellant suggests that the fact that a portion of Appellee's paycheck was 
deposited into the same credit union account that contained his inheritance funds suggests 
commingling of marital funds. Further, Appellant states that money from the credit 
union account was used to pay for a car which was used for family obligations and family 
matters. Relying on this, Appellant argues that this means that funds used for marital 
purposes were commingled with the inheritance funds. Appellant's brief is misleading 
and fails to marshal the evidence on this point which supports the trial court's finding. 
The court correctly found that the only money deposited from Mr. Arnason's paycheck 
into the credit union account was the amount necessary to pay the loan on the car. At the 
conclusion of the trial the court stated, 
The only family expenses that were paid out of that account with the credit 
union was the payment on the car. It was amounts taken out of Mr. 
Arnason's check to pay a loan with that credit union. Other than that the 
money that was in that account was used primarily, if not exclusively, for 
the down payments on the homes and to receive that money that was given 
to Mr. Arnason by his mother. 
Record at 227, p. 142, In. 9-16. Mr. Arnason's testimony supports this finding. During 
trial the court asked, "How much was taken out of your paycheck each month to go into 
that account?" Whereupon Mr. Arnason answered, "Well, I'm not sure exactly it was for 
the car payment which was 400 and something, the Buick Park Avenue, the '88." Record 
at 227, p. 56, In. 4-8. Thus, the only money from the credit union account which was 
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used to for family expenses was an amount which came from Mr, Amason's paycheck 
and was used to pay the automobile * 
linally, in ail altciiipl toestabliJi ili.il \w lund. \ n1 - .riiinnjjlul, Apprllaiil 
ivlii.^  i M i" *'M'i "> i1 M1' \ mason did not soeci y iumi un, wear and stated intent 
that he wanted to keep the funds separate * *, !nn\ e\ ei, is
 v onrarv to the language of 
H fi9ifew yen, wherein, the court held thai ni mahing a property di \ ision, the court should 
geneully awaid pmpeily jajiiuvd I) ,' iim *\n 11si1 by J.MI'I iiiul mlici'iliim i" ilium)', Ihr 
marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 'that spouse, together with any 
, :.uion or enhancement of its value, There is no Utah law which suggests that if a 
pam does iun pi - .ciment... .... . •, . » .. 
proper llii - s .-. in iaci, die cases cited above, 
....wijin the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal- u;"~:;nvd a iri.il courts determination 
that separate funds used to purchase marital 1 lomes or other family property, suggest that 
lln pu sumpliuii i' Iiiul llic squr.ilr Iumi1 IIIMMI in pun lusv u lininc ivnmin sppiiuli1 
p,i< iptTt y. None of those cases state that the p-*rtv making the down payment with 
inheritance funds had the specific intent at the time of the purchases to keep the property 
squiak Appell.inl mmli l III hi1 Ihh i mill hnhl fluill i JMIIs " n t.wpio1 lln pu i iiilll 
intent at the time of purchase to keep the property separate, i o the conti ary, it is 
Appellant's burden to show that the funds were consumed or lost their identity 
Appellant, did not sustain this burden. 
1 In1 In il nil mi |iii\iM\'illy sl.tirtl u i t \ tpiifif1 rli 11 to llmr f'Vmil flint this prnpnh 
is separate. That there is a separa: . ihis property, this money that was given .. 
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Arnason by his mother and was used as a down payment and as contribution toward the 
purchase of the homes." Record at 227 p. 141, In. 24-25; p. 142, In. 1-3. There is 
sufficient and substantial evidence upon which the trial court based its findings. This 
Court should accordingly uphold the trial court's findings of fact regarding separate and 
marital property. 
II. APPELLEE MADE NO GIFT TO THE MARITAL ESTATE OF HIS 
INHERITANCE FUNDS OR PROCEEDS FROM SELLING HIS CARBON 
COUNTY PROPERTY, THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
REFUSED TO INCLUDE THE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS IN ITS DIVISION 
OF PROPERTY 
Appellant's second argument assumes that Appellee made a gift to the marital 
estate of his inheritance funds and proceeds from selling his Carbon County property. 
The entire argument relies on this assumption being correct. However, this assumption is 
contrary to the findings of fact of the court. Unless Appellant overcomes the high burden 
of proving that the court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, this court need not 
even address the second argument regarding division of property. Appellant's contention 
is merely that the court's division of property is inequitable, and is based on the 
assumption that the trial court incorrectly categorized the property as separate. 
Appellant made no argument above that the proceeds from the sale of the Carbon 
County home were marital property, nor did she marshal the evidence used by the court 
to support its finding that the proceeds from the Carbon County home were Mr. 
Arnason's separate property. Appellant's second argument simply assumes, contrary to 
the evidence, that the proceeds from the Carbon County property were a gift to the 
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marital, estate. The uncontested findings of fact state that Petitioner used $20,000 from 
the sale of his premarital property located in Carbon County to pay down the mortgage 
on llir .sandy huiin " Inn h luiuN .111' Iniiwl II In1 srpai.Hr pntpi i l \ ml IVtitionn 
|App* lhr | ;m<l :i i" i»ol marital proprrfv." Record at 212, f 2 x . xm, *x**~mg was basc= 
the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Arnason who stated that he owned the property free 
and clear prior to the marriage, and which was soid ;*>; ;:zi,uuu i; - >20,000 of 
" l|K I1 "'MS jpp l 1 ' I1 ' " "111 ^UUl', 'I'"I)4J|JI l^ i ' ioh l . * ! M l p ,(l III, II ,1"l. ' . ' ' 
HI. EVEN IF THE COURT USES AN ABUSE OF
 D I S C R E T I Q N STANDARD, THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE 
INHERITANCE AND PARTNERSHIP FUNDS. AS WELL AS THE PROCEEDS 
FROM THE CARBON COUNTY HOME WERE SEPARPATE PROPERTY OF 
MR, ARNASON 
~--
(
 e property has been found to be marital funds by a court, the court then has 
-w n^ ;•.'. - .. .. property ^ ' |T| 
properlvc \K^HW 'henarties -• ^r^ :r r ut of the marital estate or as separate 
pi i - ic niner. Dunn i \ -v - SfT r : * 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).' 
The * \iurt of \ppeais generally requires detailed tindings as to llic clussilicdluni of 
Haumont, 793 P 2d 421 (I Jtaii Ct App 1990). 
Thus, the issue of whether the marital estate was proper!) • divid = • I : ill) arises if the Court 
finds that the findings of fact of the trial court were clearly erroneous. 
A. Ihe trial court did not abuse its discretion 
V" "\- Xpivllani states that the argument is one of property division, the actual 
;oo„o argued by Appellant appears to the same as in the previous argument: whether the 
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findings that the inheritance funds and proceeds of the Carbon County home were 
correctly found to be separate property of Appellee or whether they were commingled to 
such a degree that they lost their identity and became part of the marital estate. The 
argument and case law set forth in the preceding section are sufficient to show that the 
trial court's findings were correct. However, even under an abuse of discretion standard, 
the findings of the trial court should not be overturned. 
1. Appellee's inheritance funds are separate property 
Appellant relies on a statement by the trial court regarding Appellee's intent, in an 
attempt to prove that the court incorrectly found the inheritance funds to be separate. The 
court stated at the end of the trial that the intent at the time of purchase of the property 
was not crucial to its finding. Record at 227 p. 142, In. 19-25. While the court did make 
this statement, it did not say that it failed to take intent into account. As cited above, 
there are numerous cases in which a party contributed separate funds to a marital property 
and upon divorce, the court granted them the amount of that separate contribution prior to 
dividing the remainder of the equity in the property. Appellee does not dispute that intent 
is one factor that should be considered upon determining whether property is separate or 
marital. Appellant attempts, however, to use intent as the conclusive factor. 
None of the cases cited by Appellant from other jurisdictions are dispositive, nor 
are they even helpful in this instance. Those cases describe a variety of circumstances 
where a court found that funds had been commingled or lost their identity and 
consequently became part of the marital estate. Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 325 
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1
 * ' - ^ - / a^;;v because unlike tiu's case, the evidence showed that 
L.CI\ intent A as 10 give a gift to both husband and wife I lore, however, no such 
21ft to both parties was maue. Mi. Aranson^ ^ i iu . . . ^ 
i i i o m \ in i M i \ i u a i i s u i i n u l l 1 ) i i l i i i I I \ . '• ' ' ...' • • .. '. •' ; ,' - ' . • 
Appellant's other citations merely state that it is possible for inherited or other 
irate property to become marital propr-: \ That principle has already been set forth 
• Utah Supicnic t ouil in ii«'i^ ;.: : • i h>\mU ^ipi'lLml i lies a 
mi iiili i! i in in I ill ippi\ils * use in re Mtin ' tv - of Finer, 920, P.2d 325, 332 (Colo. App, 
1990J, io support her position which, however. ^ Acml) distinguishable. In Feiner, the 
husband, testified that he put the properties in joint tenancy in ordei to pi o vide assets to 
however, no such intent was expressed by Mi Arnason. In another case cited by 
Appt IliJiiii, In re Marria ge ofMeisner, 715 P.2d 1273 (Colo. App. 1985), the Colorado 
cnurtof appeals aliirmed a trial cowl r> I hidings thai piupri(> W w iiiiiiii.il kiM/tl (nilli i 
the finding h\ tin1 tun! i \\\\\\ lh:)t the husband's intent in purchasing share was to make a 
J investment I !nlike Meisner, the trial court here found that Mr, A i mason's intent 
was not crucial, and that the property was not commingled or gifted to the marriage. 
I'm.iiU n fiMin/ihiip v limns "I l \ V 'd 96, 99 (Alaska I'Wfi), nUii/nl in '\ppoll;ml lor the 
pi incipal that property acquired can become marital
 r v, the court held thir * hough 
the separate property was placed in a joint account and rv »ih m^naiiu and w iK ...iu 
I I mi in In i ill n\ei the ()iiii|Hil v ml WAS In Id illli.ill 1114 |ii'nptHh n m.mini u'pitMli f i 
divorce. 
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The cases cited by Appellant effectively show what was set forth in Mortensen: 
that separate funds may become marital funds through commingling, exchanges, or plain 
intent to give a gift of the property to the marital estate. They do not, however, show that 
the trial court in this case erred in determining that the inheritance funds received by Mr. 
Aranson were at the beginning and remained his separate property. Mr. Aranson did not 
commingle his inheritance funds. There is no clear evidence suggesting that the property 
was so commingled as to lose is identity or become untraceable. Only the inheritance 
funds, which were used to purchase the Salt Lake home, were placed in a joint account. 
Even then, those funds did not become so commingled that they were untraceable or 
unidentifiable. Additionally, testimony at trial established that the funds used for 
improvements to the home were received from Mr. Arnason's mother and then 
distributed to the contractors. 
Appellant's cites to Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 535-36 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), and Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 849-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) are 
inapplicable because in both those cases the court found that cash gifts had been given to 
both the husband and Wife jointly, and not to one party separately. 
Case law appears to hold that Utah courts will not allow property to remain 
separate where it has been consumed. See Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304. If Appellee had 
actually used the funds to rent a home, or to pay for the daily living expenses, then the 
court arguably would not be able to award those funds to Appellee prior to an equitable 
division of the remaining property. That, however, is not the issue in the instant case. 
Here Appellee invested his funds into properties which maintained their value, and in fact 
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increased in value, rhe identity of those funds was not lost, nor were those fu^Js 
consumed. Their value is traceable and remains to this day in the ^and> and t u ;>a;t 
I ,ake homes, The trial court, pursuant to settled 
ApiH'lli.v ill*1 W-^ IIH ul Ins sopai.ite ptiifitiiy invested in those homes, and then divided the 
icmoiiiiiip eniu'tv ^.]ua!!^ arnung the parties. Contrary to Appellant's assertion, there is 
no e* iden^e wnu'i plainly shows that Appellee made a gill nl Ins uiiiculaih t. '" -I« " il" 
u u l err^ a t [ts findings accordingly should be upheld. 
1
 iiie funds from the sale m me i-.an?uiS v uuu.v HUUL UJ>. A J ^ X , . ^ , 
separate property 
* \ i *oellee' s Carbon County home was properly found to be separate 
propc.^. :he home was acquired in the 1970 s, prior to his marriage to Appellant. 
Appellee lived in 11K nume until . - , Kecoraat^, - " f"» In I I %, 111 home-
w its "-il ii : /eedb were used to pay the 
-• ** • parties iaiiuiy home in bai.^j i , \ * r" 
Appellant cites Dunn, for the proposition that proceeds Irom the sale ol a spouse's 
premarital piopcd) should In I» Livsiln d <i'> i mi.il | n|n t\) I I'imri Iln i m i HI led (hat 
uv proceeds became part of 'the marital estate because they were commingled, consumed, 
, ihe form, of a promissory note, made payable to both husband and wife jointly. 
' . . . . . . J ; . . . • • e 
n > ' --ivcvds of the sale of each credited piece of p«< )eri> were 
deposited into the parties' joint accoui-- " " " "act, here the proceeds were first plnrrd 
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in Mr. Arnason's separate bank account, and then used to pay down the mortgage on the 
Sandy home. 
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) is factually similar to the 
instant case. In both cases, one party owned a home prior to marriage. Id. In both cases 
the separate home was sold and the proceeds were applied to a new marital home. Id. 
And in both cases, the court awarded the donating party the value of their separate 
investment in the home prior to dividing the remainder of the equity as marital property. 
Id. In accordance with Humphreys v. Humphreys, the trial court's finding that the 
proceeds were separate property was not erroneous. 
In the present case, the Carbon County home was sold for $21,000, $1,000 of 
which had been consumed or lost it's identity through use on expenses of the household 
and was therefore not awarded to Mr. Arnason. The trial court acted properly in 
awarding Appellee those funds which it found to be separate property of the Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court had two tasks in dividing the property: the first was to make 
findings as to whether the property was marital, or whether it was separate; the second 
task was to then divide the property from the marital estate equitably. The trial court 
committed no error in finding that the inheritance funds, as well as the funds from the 
sale of the Carbon County home, were the separate property of Mr. Arnason and not 
marital property. The court properly found that no gift had been made of those marital 
funds, nor had they been commingled with the marital funds. Those funds were received 
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M from j ^ s mother. The court found that those funds were identifiable and 
traceable to the two homes and stocks purchased by Mr. Arnason 
• »i .be reasons set forth above, Appclhv irspn Hi 
1. '* oi iact that A ppeILc" <> iiihuitance funds 
neither lost their identity, nor were they commingled uith the marital e>;jte 
2. Uphold the trial court's finding .»u »!., proceed 
Coi mt) home arc scpamlc piuprii^, • , ; •'' . . ' • 
3. I fphold the 'trial court's distribution of property; and 
-I \ ward Appellee his costs in defending this appeal, pursuant to Utah R. 
^ pp hoe. 34(a), and tor any other iciicl (Ins u n i t IIIKJ-I. HI lie i i p p m p i M l i , 1 , 
D a t e d h ? h m ; i r \ '"' .'(HI11 . . '.' • • ' • 
_i -J±^-
David N. Kelley 
M. Byron Fisher 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellee Anthony Dav id Am:; 
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239599.1 ' 2\ 
Tab A 
M. Byron Fisher, A1082 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANTHONY DAVID ARNASON, ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
BEVERLY SUE ARNASON, ) No. 974901978DA 
Respondent. ) Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge, 
presiding on April 19, 1999. The parties were present and were represented by their legal 
counsel of record. More than ninety days have passed since the filing of the Complaint herein. 
The parties have complied with the statutory requirements of attendance at parenting class and 
of providing verification of income and filing child support worksheets. The parties presented 
testimony and evidence. Legal counsel for the parties presented argument as to issues of law 
'^SraBr 
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and fact, and the court, having reviewed all pleadings, the evidence, testimony and the law 
presented and being fully advised now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent are and for more than three months prior to the 
filing of this Complaint have been actual and bona fide residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. The parties hereto are husband and wife, having been married in Salt Lake 
City, Utah on August 26, 1983. 
3. There have been three children bom as issue of this marriage, Andrea 
Amason, bom August 7,1984, now age 14, Cassandra Amason, bom November 9, 1987, now 
age 11, and Troy Alexander Amason, bom August 26, 1990, now age 8. 
4. For many months prior to the separation of the parties in April, 1997, the 
parties have experienced many differences, which have become irreconcilable, including 
Respondent commencing a relationship with another man. There are good and sufficient 
grounds for granting of divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
5. Petitioner is a fit and proper person and should be awarded the legal care, 
custody and control of the three minor children, Petitioner should be awarded possessory 
custody of Andrea and Troy and Petitioner should be their primary care provider. The parties 
should be awarded joint possessory custody of Cassandra. The child should be in the custody of 
Respondent overnight and in the custody of Petitioner during the day except for the statutory 
visitation periods. 
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6. Respondent should be awarded reasonable visitation with the minor children 
and should have at least statutory minimum visitation rights as provided in Sections 30-3-35, 
U.C., 1997, and additional visitation as the children and the parties may agree and as may be in 
the best interests of the children. In addition to joint possessory custody of Cassandra, 
Petitioner should be awarded statutory visitation rights with Cassandra as to weekday evenings, 
weekends, holidays, special holidays and extended summer visitation periods. 
7. The Statutory Advisory Guidelines, Section 30-3-33 U.C., 1997, and the 
provisions for special circumstances, Section 30-3-36 U.C. 1997, and the provisions as to 
relocation, Section 30-3-37 U.C, 1997, should apply. Copies of these statutes are attached for 
assistance of the parties.) 
8. The Court specifically finds that the parties are equally bonded to the minor 
children, that Petitioner has been the primary care provider for the three minor children for the 
past two years since the separation of the parties, that Petitioner can provide a more stable-
environment for the children in that Respondent maintains a relationship with a man outside of 
marriage and has demonstrated a use and acquiescence to the use of marijuana which is not a 
proper environment for the minor children. The Court also finds that the minor child, 
Cassandra, has resided half time with Respondent since October, 1998 and that this arrangement 
has been satisfactory for the child. However, Petitioner should remain the responsible party for 
continuing clinical psychiatric care for Cassandra and for the continuing of prescribed 
medication. Petitioner should also continue as the responsible party for the schooling of 
Cassandra, either under the present home school program or in private or pubic school. 
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Petitioner should consult with Respondent as to the education and medical decisions concerning 
Cassandra. 
9. Based upon the child support work sheets attached hereto, Respondent 
should pay child support of $605.00 per month for the support of Andrea and Troy and $7.00 
per month for the support of Cassandra and $75 per month as one-half of medical insurance • 
premiums for the three minor children totaling child support of $687.00 per month commencing 
April 19, 1999 and continuing thereafter until each child reaches 18 years of age, is emancipated 
or graduates from high school in the normal course whichever should occur later. 
10. Child support of $687.00 per month should be paid pursuant to the statutory 
child support guidelines and based on the income of the parties set forth in the child support 
worksheet filed herein. One half of child support shall be due by the 5th and one half by the 20th 
of each month. 
11. The parties have equitably divided their personal property, furniture and 
furnishings including the furnishings and furniture of the minor children, and each should be 
awarded the personal property now in their possession as their sole and separate property. 
12- Petitioner should be awarded his 1988 Buick Park Avenue automobile and 
he should be awarded his personal belongings as his sole and separate property. 
13. Each party should pay their own debts and obligations incurred in their own 
name and should hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
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14. Neither party should be awarded alimony herein. Both parties are fully 
capable of providing for their own needs. Respondent's admitted cohabitation since separation 
would foreclose any claim for alimony. 
15. Petitioner should maintain health and accident insurance for the minor 
children. Each party pay one-half of the actual medical insurance premiums, co-pay and 
medical, dental, orthodontic and eye care expenses for the minor children not covered by 
insurance. 
16. Petitioner waives any interest, right or claim to any of the employment 
claims of Respondent filed through the office of equal employment opportunity or through her 
employer. 
17. The parties waive the requirement of income withholding and respondent 
should pay the child support directly to petitioner until further order of the Court. 
18. Petitioner and Respondent should maintain their own life insurance policies 
with the minor children of the parties as named beneficiaries thereof. 
19. The Court finds that Petitioner received gifts and inheritance from his 
parent's estate and from his parent's trust and partnership which funds were separated by him 
into his own account and were used for down payment on his home in Sandy, Utah, and for 
down payment and major improvement on the home of the parties in Salt Lake City, Utah and 
for the purchase of Novell common stock. These funds were not commingled in any form with 
marital funds or funds of Respondent. 
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20. Respondent's claim as to the intent of Petitioner at the time the funds were 
invested in the two properties and the stock is not determinative in this proceeding. The source 
of the funds used was identifiable and was traceable to the investments made which 
characterized the funds as separate assets of Petitioner and not marital assets of the parties. The 
funds were not commingled and are determined to be separate property interests of Petitioner. 
21. Petitioner received $20,000 in the sale of his premarital property located in 
Carbon County, Utah, which funds were used to pay down the principal due on the mortgage of 
the Sandy, Utah home which funds are found to be separate property of Petitioner and are not 
marital property. 
22. The real and personal property of the parties should be divided equitably 
pursuant to Exhibit P-8 which follows: 
Asset Marital Equity Awarded to Awarded to 
Petitioner Respondent 
1) Sandy Home awarded to 
Petitioner 
Appraised 205,000.00 
Mortgage, $853.37 per month (112,256.00) 
Separate Down (Husband) ( 47,527.00) 
( 20,000.00) 25,217.00 
2) Salt Lake Home awarded to 
Respondent 
Appraised 130,000.00 
Mortgage, $417.80 per month (14,864.00) 40,329.00 
Separate Down (Husband) (74,807.00) 74,807.00 
3) 401k Retirement 84,076.00 84,076.00 
4) 401k Retirement 48,233.00 48,233.00 
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5) IRA (Marital) 
6) Stock Holdings (Novell) 
Inheritance, Separate property 
of Petitioner 
7) 1988 Buick Park Avenue 
8) Personal Property 
TOTALS 
Difference 
Vi from Wife 
Division 
6,000.00 
1,800.00 
Minimum 
6,000.00 
Novell stock 
1,800.00 
12.000.00 
129,093.00 
2.000.00 
165, 369.00 
36,276.00 
18,138.00 (18,138.00) 
147.231.00 147.231.00 
23. Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent and an equitable lien 
against the Salt Lake City home in the amount of $92,945.00 being $74,807.00 as Petitioner's 
separate interest in the home and $18,138.00 as the amount necessary to equalize the division of 
assets between the parties. Judgment shall not accrue interest until the amount is due. 
Respondent shall pay the amount of the judgment to Petitioner at the first occurrence of one of 
the following events: 
A. the minor child Cassandra is emancipated or reaches 18 years of age; 
B. the home is sold; 
C. the home is no longer used as Respondent's principal place of 
residence; 
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D. Respondent remarries; 
E. Respondent cohabits with a person of the opposite sex. 
After the date of occurrence of one of the above events, this judgment should accrue interest at 
the legal rate until paid. 
24. Petitioner should be awarded additional judgment against Respondent for 
$2,545.16 for temporary child support arrearages, medical insurance premiums due and medical 
expenses of the minor children due through April 19, 1999. 
25. Petitioner's claim for lost rent on the Salt Lake City home is denied. 
26. The parties should cooperate in the execution of the documents, deeds, 
conveyances or transfers necessary to effectuate the division of assets between the parties as set 
forth herein. 
27. Each party should pay their own attorneys' fees and costs involved in this 
proceeding. 
28. Petitioner should claim the oldest and youngest children as dependents for 
income tax purposes. Respondent should claim the middle child as a dependent for income tax 
purposes. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and for good cause appearing, upon 
motion of plaintiffs counsel, the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over 
the parties and the minor children to this action. 
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2. The parties have completed the required parenting class. (Certificates of 
Completion are filed herein. 
3. The parties have filed the required verification of income. 
4. Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce from Respondent upon 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and absolute upon signing 
and filing of the same in the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk. 
5. The Decree of Divorce granted to Petitioner should be in conformance 
with the foregoing Finding^ of Fact. y 
DATED this (£f day of /WMsj 1999. 
BY THE 
Approved as to Form: 
avid Pauf 
Attorney for Respondent 
District Judge 
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